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Minima temporalia: 
Tempo spazio esperienza 
By Giacomo Marramao 
Milano: II Saggiatore, 1990 
Giacomo Marramao, professor of 
Philosophy of Politics at the Istituto 
Universitario Orientate in Naples, is 
one of the young Italian philosophers 
who are trying to keep on the task of 
thinking "after" and "beyond" 
Heidegger. In so doing, they are con-
fronted with the most demanding 
words of the Western tradition, the 
same problems Heidegger investigat-
ed all his life: being, time, experience, 
feeling, representation, and image. Is 
it possible to re-consider these words 
in a way that is not just a repetition of 
what Heidegger has already done? 
It is a risky task, which forces the 
philosopher to draw lines and to cre-
ate divisions in a vast territory, leaving 
plenty of space for criticism. So 
Marramao is forced to sketch a very 
short "history of time" at the begin-
ning of his book. In Marramao' s 
account, Plato's and Aristotle's defini-
tion of time, although based on repre-
sentation and number, did not clearly 
divide between "internal" and "exter-
nal" time, between aion and chronos, 
or, in Latin, aevum and tempus. This 
"classical" balance cracked with 
Augustine. Internal time (distensio 
animi) was separated from the "time of 
the world." Inner time became ecstat-
ic; external time, on the contrary, was 
imagined as a line. Augustine's dis-
tinction became rule in philosophy, all 
the way up to Husserl. And, after 
Husserl and Einstein, many tried to 
include the "psychological arrow" of 
time in the scientific vision of the uni-
verse-11 ya Prigogine and Isabelle 
Stengers among them. The latter have 
discovered, or re-discovered, that 
nature is asymmetrical to time. While 
the laws of physics seem to operate in 
a timeless environment where the 
time-variable does not alterate any 
equation, entropy, decay, and irre-
versibility of time dominate the world 
of the living. Prigogine and Stengers 
tried to connect these environments to 
the possibility of a new alliance 
between "hard" sciences and human 
sciences. However, Marramao points 
out, Prigogine and Stengers still seem 
to view the asymmetry of time as 
something anomalous, versus the sym-
metry. They are still looking for the 
"sufficient reason" of asymmetry, and 
so they are repeating the well-known 
metaphysical gesture of looking for 
the fondamentum inconcussum. 
From this point on, Marramao 
turns to Leibniz and Heidegger for a 
new look at the issue of the principle 
of sufficient reason, which starts with 
the "most important" of all questions: 
Why something instead of nothing? 
But the question, too, is based on the 
assumption that Nothing comes before 
Being, that Nothing is more "origi-
nary" than Being. On his part, 
Heidegger has given more importance 
to the event of Leibniz's question than 
to the ontological problem that the 
question poses. In Marramao's opin-
ion, Heidegger failed to grasp the 
importance of the issue, applying a 
reductionist view to Leibniz and 
Descartes in order to build his "onto-
historical" periodization of modernity. 
The real problem is that, after 
Descartes and Leibniz, the "classical" 
balance between subject and reality 
was lost, so that reality increasingly 
was constructed and shaped by the 
subject. On this regard, the role of per-
spective became essential, both in 
Renaissance painting and in the devel-
opment of thought. The transcenden-
tal, Kantian subject entered Western 
thought with the Renaissance perspec-
tive. From then on, perspective 
(linked to space) and expectation 
(linked to time), began to be superim-
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posed on each other. 
But time "in itself," so Marramao 
argues, is never to be found. 
Heidegger's identity of time and 
Being is not satisfactory . As we know 
from Augustine to Husserl, time is 
philosophy's hell. No one has ever 
been able to describe time without 
using metaphors borrowed from the 
realm of space. So, if time has always 
been representation of time, what is 
representation? 
Heidegger made us aware that per-
spective, transformation of the world 
into image, Descartes' emphasis on 
method, and Nietzsche 's Will to Power 
are all in a line, all steps along the his-
tory of subject. In the long run, 
nihilism and constructivism coincide. 
But, Marramao insists, Heidegger 
underestimated the pathos at the bot-
tom of Descartes' cogito. After the 
Copernican revolution and its destruc-
tion of the faith in the senses, cogito 
remained the only pillar on which the 
world was built. This is what makes 
nihilism apparently unsurpassable. 
The development of subjectivity gave 
then birth, as Foucault pointed out, to 
the project of history, to the "birth of 
man" as subject and object of the repre-
sentation- that is, included in its own 
representation of the world. But, this 
triumph of the representation turned 
out to be the beginning of its end. In 
Marramao' s opinion, Foucault showed 
how the transcend en ta! subject 
"exploded" from representation to 
endless drift (deriva), his periodization 
of Modernity opposes validly Heideg-
ger's. It is still an hermeneutic circle, 
but, at the same time, the vertigo of 
infinite self-reference. 
The problem is that perspective 
engulfs experience. In order to have 
more time, everything is temporalized. 
Historical conscience and museifica-
tion of the past proceed on parallel 
tracks. As Benjamin stressed, the out-
come of modernity is the impoverish-
ment of real experience. Is it possible 
to fill in the empty space between 
experience and perspective, present 
time and expectation, existence and 
project? 
According to Marramao, Benjamin 
and Heidegger do not give us any 
non-metaphysical answer to the ques-
tion. Neither do some recent develop-
ments of Italian philosophy, from the 
hope in an epiphanic healing from 
nihilism in Emanuele Severino, to the 
dissolution of the subject advocated by 
Gianni Vattimo. 
Marramao' s proposal is to move 
aside of the problem (spostamento lat-
erale). We need another visualization. 
What generates the assumption that 
time has a direction? In order to 
answer, it takes an anti-anthropomor-
phic view, as provided by the most 
recent scientific discoveries. But here, 
instead of going deeper into the cur-
rent scientific debate, Marramao turns 
to Baudelaire. In Les fleurs du ma/, 
Baudelaire deprives time of any 
"time" metaphor, using only "space" 
metaphors instead. In Baudelaire, 
experience is, so to speak, spatialized. 
Like in Plato's Thymaeus, Baudelaire's 
time is aion. There is no "inside": 
inside is out, and the original cosmo-
logical experience is reduced to 
anthropology no more. 
Marramao's points are worthy of 
attention, and, at their best, challeng-
ing. What causes perplexity is the 
quick pace of the book and its enor-
mously ambitious purpose squeezed 
into 154 pages. The transitions 
between Leibniz's question, the 
author's criticism of Heidegger, the 
Renaissance perspective, and 
Descartes' method are too fast. While 
reproaching Heidegger for being easy 
in historical periodization, Marramao 
does his best to out-Heidegger 
Heidegger. Maybe Heidegger is not 
aware of the pathos underlying 
Descartes' cogito , but this does not 
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change Heidegger's point. In Was ist 
das-die Philosophie?, Heidegger stress-
es that since Descartes the Greek 
pathos (the "sense of wonder" before 
the Kosmos) has been replaced by 
method and the quest for certainty. 
This is the experience of modernity. 
Besides, "spatializing" time, as 
Baudelaire did, is no solution to the 
philosophical dead end of time's issue. 
It is Marramao himself who points out 
that time has always been "spatially" 
represented. Furthermore, Baude-
laire's "spatialization" of time looks 
more like the fulfillment of the project 
of modernity than the restoration of a 
"classical" balance that is lost and it is 
not possible to revive. Yet, Baudelaire 
understands the symbolic, aionic 
power of metaphors more than any 
other modern poet, but his aim is t~ 
clarify his vision in a way that is not 
opposed to Descartes ' project. 
Baudelaire "spatializes" time to put it 
mto perspective, in the most clear and 
visible representation. It is hard to see 
how Baudelaire can be included in 
Marramao's spostamento laterale. Why 
didn't Marramao proceed to investi-
gate the relationship between time and 
the current bio-physical sciences? 
Prigogine's metaphysics is not the 
only one which needs to be "decon-
structed." 
ALESSANDRO CARRERA 
University of Houston 
lnstitutiones Oratoriae 
By Giambattista Vico 
Critical text, notes, and introductory 
essay by Giuliano Crifo. 
Naples: lstituto Suor Orsola 
Benincasa, 1989 
The difficult circumstances of Giam-
battista Vico's life are well-doc-
umented. The son of a bookseller of 
very modest means, he managed to 
earn a degree in law, despite many dif-
ficulties. After several years ("a 
stranger in his own country") at 
Vatolla nel Cilento as a tutor to the 
sons of the rich Marquis Domenico 
Rocca, Vico decided in 1699, at the age 
of 31, to compete for the chair of 
rhetoric at the University of Naples. 
Although he had originally intended 
to teach rhetoric only temporarily, 
upon winning the chair he resigned 
himself to going no further, disap-
pointed and embittered in his hopes to 
win a chair of law. Rhetoric thus 
became for the Neapolitan philoso-
pher the study of a lifetime. 
It is to his teaching of that "most 
difficult art of saying" that we owe the 
Institutiones Oratoriae, his collected 
university lectures, which he clearly 
made his students study. An abbre-
viated Italian version was published in 
1844 and republished the following 
year in a Latin edition based on the 
original text put forth by Vico in 1711. 
The Institutiones have never been of 
particular interest to the his-
toriography of Vico's philosophy, con-
sidered as they are to be of little 
importance in the general structure of 
his thought and even today dismissed 
as a "merely academic task," a dry, 
sterile work of compilation, according 
to the view expressed by Italian N eo-
Id ealism, and particularly by Fausto 
Nicolini. Furthermore, the many stud-
ies by Nicolini alone (who with Croce 
also edited the critical edition of Vico's 
